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Many commentators viewed the FDP’s defeat in the 2013 Bundestag elections, when the party 
failed to cross the 5% electoral threshold, as the end of the German liberal party. This view 
was further confirmed by another local election which the FDP lost, and by the dwindling 
number of party members. The FDP became a symbol of the maladies affecting German po-
litical life, and of politicians’ faults: clientelism, opportunism, a lack of direction and greed. 
The party had been present in the Bundestag for 64 subsequent years, and had been a mem-
ber of government coalitions for 45 years. It also served as the power base for two presidents 
of Germany, as well as for Hans-Dietrich Genscher, for many years Germany’s foreign minister. 
However, during a period of just four years (2009–2013), when it co-ruled the country along-
side the CDU/CSU, the FDP became unelectable.
Regardless of the fact that the party has no representation in the Bundestag and that many 
prominent activists have left its ranks, the FDP’s new leader, Christian Lindner, has managed 
to regain the attention of the national media and radically change the party’s image. Back 
in October 2014, the FDP had deputies in six local parliaments and was not a member of any 
coalition; at present, however, the FDP has representatives in nine out of 16 local parliaments 
and is a member of ruling coalitions in Rhineland-Palatinate, North Rhine-Westphalia and 
Schleswig-Holstein. If the elections to the Bundestag had been held on Sunday, 27 August 
2017, the party would have garnered around 8% of the votes. It could also have hoped to form 
a ruling coalition with the Christian Democrats. A political alliance with the SPD would be 
less likely. However, should the FDP lose approval in the final weeks of the campaign and fail 
to bring its representatives into parliament again, it will be extremely difficult for the party to 
survive for another four years.
The defeat of the dream coalition
The now 38-year-old Lindner became the par-
ty’s leader in 2013. At that time, even some 
party members did not expect the FDP to sur-
vive. After four years in the ruling coalition 
alongside the CDU/CSU, the FDP was viewed by 
society as a party with no direction, one that 
only cared for the particular interests of its sup-
porters’ lobbies, and one that failed to deliver 
on its electoral promises. This assessment fol-
lowed on from a turbulent four-year-long col-
laboration between the FDP and the Christian 
Democrats. Initially, the coalition of these two 
parties had been viewed as a recipe for success 
due to the similarity of their programmes. How-
ever, paradoxically, it turned out to be beset by 
conflicts. The liberals intended to immediate-
ly begin delivering on the promise contained 
in their electoral slogan “More net than gross 
[income]”, which they understood as lowering 
taxes, reforming the income tax regime, re-
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ducing state subsidies, launching savings pro-
grammes to consolidate public finances and lib-
eralising employment laws. However, they met 
with resistance from the German Chancellery. 
As a proponent of the policy of ‘small steps’, 
Chancellor Angela Merkel argued that no major 
reforms should be carried out without strong 
public support. Disputes emerged between the 
liberals and the Christian Democrats just a few 
weeks after the formation of the government, 
and the FDP’s approval ratings began to drop 
rapidly: from the figure of over 14% which it 
had garnered in the election (because it had 
positioned itself as a party of great competence 
in economic affairs, which was of major impor-
tance in the situation of a financial crisis), they 
fell to around 5%. 
The conflicts between the coalition members, 
involving for example the energy transition 
programme, personal data protection, Euro-
pean policy, and the role of Erika Steinbach, 
the chairperson of the Federation of Expellees, 
in Germany’s foreign and domestic policy, last-
ed throughout the government’s term. There 
were situations in which the ruling parties 
made temporary alliances with the SPD and 
the Greens, the opposition parties in the Bun-
destag. For example, Chancellor Merkel was 
backed by the opposition during the Bundestag 
votes on aid packages for Greece and mech-
anisms to stabilise the euro1. The FDP, for its 
part, voted alongside the Social Democrats and 
1 See M. Zawilska-Florczuk, The strength of the Christian 
Democrats, the weakness of the opposition. Germany 
before the parliamentary elections, OSW Commentary, 
17 September 2013, https://www.osw.waw.pl/en/pub-
likacje/osw-commentary/2013-09-17/strength-chris-
tian-democrats-weakness-opposition-germany
the Greens for the election of Joachim Gauck 
as Germany’s president, which Chancellor 
Merkel opposed. 
The conflicts with the coalition parties (the CDU, 
and in particular the CSU), the failure to deliv-
er on major electoral promises2, the unceasing 
support for key liberal policies in matters such 
as support for employee (the refusal to offer fi-
nancial aid to thousands of individuals who lost 
their jobs as a result of the Schlecker drugstore 
chain going bankrupt, as well as those working 
at the Opel manufacturing plant in Bochum) 
all led to a permanent drop in the party’s ap-
proval rating, which in turn translated into 
a series of defeats in local elections. 
As a consequence, a rash and rapid campaign 
was launched to bring to account those peo-
ple who were guilty of these failures. Back in 
2011, a group had formed within the party, led 
by Philipp Rösler, minister of health, and Chris-
tian Lindner, then the party’s secretary-general, 
which was in opposition to the party chief 
Vice-Chancellor Guido Westerwelle who, it 
should be noted had been behind the party’s 
historic success in the Bundestag elections. 
Rösler and Lindner received unofficial support 
from Hans-Dietrich Genscher. At the May 2011 
party convention, Westerwelle was forced to 
abandon his plan to seek re-election as party 
chief. Later, he also resigned from the office of 
Vice-Chancellor and was replaced by Rösler, but 
retained the office of foreign minister. Despite 
these shifts, the voters remained unimpressed. 
The FDP continued to lose seats in subsequent 
local parliaments, and in the campaign preced-
ing the 2013 Bundestag elections it backed 
Rainer Brüderle, a long-time FDP MP and a for-
mer minister of the economy, a jovial person 
who often committed gaffes. The chaotic FDP 
2 The FDP failed to persuade its coalition partner to con-
siderably lower taxes and thereby to deliver on the liber-
al party’s main electoral promise. At the same time, the 
reduction of the VAT rate for the hotel industry solidified 
the image of the FDP as a clientelist party; it has been 
revealed that one of Germany’s hotel chain owners is 
a generous sponsor of the party.
The FDP’s chaotic campaign garnered 
them just 4.8% of the votes in the Sep-
tember 2013 elections, and they failed 
to cross the electoral threshold.
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campaign3 and the emergence of the Alterna-
tive for Germany party (AfD), which at that time 
strongly supported free market policies, result-
ed in the liberals winning just 4.8% of the votes 
in the elections held on 22 September 2013, 
and failing to cross the electoral threshold.
Lindner: ‘I am the party’
At the party convention in April 2017, Lindner 
argued that after four years a lot has changed 
in the FDP, including “its sound, outfit and 
centres of gravity” (Sound, Auftreten, Schwer-
punkte). This is an apt summary of the results 
of his actions aimed at saving the party. In his 
efforts to reform the FDP, Lindner has placed 
the greatest emphasis on image: the party col-
ours have been changed (magenta was added 
to yellow and blue), the activists began to ap-
pear in public meetings wearing not suits but 
t-shirts and trainers, and to use a hybrid, An-
glicised language in both their speeches and 
on posters and electoral spots (Beta Republik 
Deutschland, German Mut, Trial und Erfolg)4. 
All this is intended to evoke the image of a dy-
namic, modern company, and to attract young 
voters working in creative and IT jobs. To make 
himself even more credible to this group, Lind-
ner regularly compares his party to a start-up.
There has also been a perceptible change in 
the party representatives’ speaking style; it has 
become strongly confrontational and sarcastic 
3 Brüderle argued in favour of casting the second vote (in-
volving a party list) for the FDP, saying that “who wants 
to have Merkel, should choose the FDP”. Moreover, the 
liberals conducted a negative campaign targeting the 
Greens, to whom they referred as a party of “prohibi-
tions and dictates”. The Greens indeed scored a poor 
result, but this did not benefit the FDP. 
4 Examples of puns: Beta Republik Deutschland – a refer-
ence to the official name of the state: Bundesrepublik 
Deutschland [Federal Republic of Germany], or BRD for 
short. The word ‘Beta’ makes a reference to terminol-
ogy used to denote subsequent versions of software. 
German Mut [German courage] is a rephrasing of the 
term ‘German angst’ [German fear] used in the English 
language to refer for example to Germany’s reluctance 
to openly assume the role of a leader in the EU. Trial 
and Erfolg, a phrase inspired by ‘trial and error’; in the 
rephrased version it means ‘trial and success’.
towards their political opponents. Due to its se-
lective criticism of some of the federal govern-
ment’s actions (for example during the migra-
tion crisis), the FDP has succeeded in generating 
the perception of a party of reasonable protest, 
similar in some of its slogans to Alternative for 
Germany in the first months of its existence 
(i.e. when the AfD was winning voters disen-
chanted with the Christian Democrats’ attitude 
towards the eurozone crisis). These changes 
continued in 2015, precisely when the AfD ex-
perienced a leadership shift and began to lean 
towards the right. The liberals managed to win 
a portion of the AfD’s bourgeois electorate and 
bring in representatives to local parliaments in 
Bremen and Hamburg, and in 2016 to local par-
liaments in Baden-Wurttemberg and the Rhein-
land-Palatinate, where the FDP is a member of 
the ruling coalition. The party’s modified image 
was accompanied by major changes to its mani-
festo, which were intended to achieve two goals:
• breaking with the heritage of Guido Wester- 
welle and Hans-Dietrich Genscher (both of 
whom died in 2016) in foreign policy, and 
open up to certain controversial demands in-
cluding expelling Greece from the eurozone 
and halting EU membership negotiations 
with Turkey;
• breaking with its reputation as a party that is 
detached from problems affecting the ‘com-
mon’ people and which depends on narrow 
interest groups.
The FDP’s present relatively high approval rat-
ing is mainly the result of its leader’s popularity. 
He has consistently built up his image by us-
ing methods more typical of the realm of show 
business rather than politics. Lindner is the 
When reforming the party, Lindner placed 
the greatest emphasis on image: par-
ty colours, the activists’ outfits and their 
speaking style. 
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most active German politician on social media 
(he writes his posts himself and engages in de-
bates with citizens), he does not shun publicity, 
and is not afraid to reveal facts from his pri-
vate life5. In this way he is creating his image as 
a politician who is close to the people, although 
by doing so he attracts the attention of not 
only major media, but also of the tabloids. He 
is always very well prepared for his broadcast 
appearances and combines a thorough knowl-
edge of the subject matter with witty rhetoric. 
The alternative to the Alternative
The present FDP manifesto is considerably dif-
ferent from the one the party presented in 
2013. in drawing up the present party manifes-
to, Lindner has listened more closely to the so-
cial mood and responded to the public’s fears. 
And importantly, he has done so in a less radi-
cal manner than the AfD. 
First and foremost, Lindner has abandoned 
the paradigm adopted by Genscher, accord-
ing to which the party was a natural ally of the 
Christian Democrats. In its present incarnation, 
the FDP is a party that emphasises its indepen- 
dence and willingness to pursue its own ideas. 
In potential coalition negotiations (with either 
of the two bigger parties) Lindner will focus on 
four issues: education, taxes (and the economy 
more broadly), internal security and migration, 
and digitisation. In the field of education, the 
party demands greater coordination at feder-
al level, so as to unify the quality of education 
offered across Germany; this is the centre of 
gravity of the FDP’s electoral manifesto and 
Lindner’s own idea. In addition, the FDP wants 
education spending from the federal budget to 
be raised, so that the quality of education in 
Germany “again reaches the global top level”. 
The liberals are in favour of far-reaching tax 
5 See In diesem Netzwerk sind die kleinen Parteien ganz 
groß, Die Welt, 27 July 2017, https://www.welt.de/poli-
tik/deutschland/article167026786/In-diesem-Netzwerk-
sind-die-kleinen-Parteien-ganz-gross.html
relief in connection with the expected budg-
etary surplus (disputes are likely to arise over 
this issue with both the CDU/CSU and the SPD). 
In domestic security policy, the FDP objects to 
the further limitation of civil freedoms and de-
mands that the number of police officers be 
increased (this is a common demand, also ex-
pressed by the Greens and the SPD, but it is not 
supported by the CDU/CSU). Alongside this, the 
FDP wants closer cooperation between states 
and data exchanges in combating internation-
al terrorism. According to Lindner, immigration 
is to serve Germany’s interests: Germany is to 
compete with the USA and Great Britain in at-
tracting talented individuals and enabling them 
to settle. This is a clear reference to the decision 
Chancellor Merkel made in 2015 when she or-
dered that borders be opened to all migrants. 
This slogan is aimed at supporters of both the 
AfD and the CDU/CSU, who want to limit immi-
gration but do not want to be labelled as xen-
ophobic. The FDP proposes that immigrants be 
legally committed to integrate, and supports 
the plan to limit the right to dual citizenship 
(to the third generation). The party sees itself 
as an “advocate of new opportunities resulting 
from digitisation”, and highlights the need to 
increase the use of digital technologies not only 
in education but also in transport, the economy 
and the public sector. This is in line with the 
image of ‘the party as start-up’ which Lindner 
has attempted to build. 
In European and international politics, the liber-
als demand that an EU foreign minister with real 
competences be appointed, and that a common 
European border guard and army be estab-
lished. They demand that the issue of states such 
as Greece leaving the eurozone be regulated, 
that EU membership negotiations with Turkey 
The centre of gravity in the FDP’s mani-
festo is no longer taxes, but education.
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be suspended, and sanctions against Russia up-
held until President Putin abandons his aggres-
sive policy towards Ukraine, or even stepped up 
should the conflict between Russia and Ukraine 
escalate. At the same time, however, in an in-
terview on 5 August 2017, Lindner support-
ed the view that the case of Crimea could be 
considered as a “lasting temporary measure”. 
This was tantamount to refusing to recog-
nise the annexation and conducting dialogue 
with Russia. Lindner compared the situation in 
Crimea to the realities of the years following the 
end of World War II, when Western Germany re-
fused to recognise the Baltic states’ annexation 
by the USSR. Lindner’s surprisingly conciliatory 
statement towards Russia is an attempt to win 
the support of Germany’s economic lobby and 
the pro-Russian supporters of other parties. 
It is also intended as a signal to the SPD that the 
liberals will not consider the war in Ukraine as 
a barrier to forming a potential coalition. 
The potential problems and conflicts
Despite the changes introduced by Lindner, the 
party’s situation ahead of the elections remains 
unstable. The main problem is the lack of per-
sonnel. Having gathered the most important 
institutional functions in the party into his own 
hands (the party leader, leader of the elector-
al campaign, head of the party organisation in 
North Rhine-Westphalia and head of the FDP 
faction in the local parliament), Lindner holds 
the power which has enabled him to build 
a new, consistent image for the party. However, 
aside from him, Wolfgang Kubicki (the head of 
the party organisation in Schleswig-Holstein) 
and Alexander Graf Lambsdorff (Vice President 
of the European Parliament) the party has no 
nationally recognisable politicians. Moreover, 
due to its four-year absence from the Bunde-
stag, combined with an outflow of human cap-
ital to the business sector, Lindner has no pow-
er base of the experts and officials who would 
support him in coalition negotiations and in 
ruling the country. This is why his announce-
ments regarding potentially joining the govern-
ment coalition are cautious; joining the gov-
ernment at all costs is neither the ultimate goal 
nor an optimum scenario for the party. Lindner 
emphasises that he would agree for his party to 
become a member of the ruling coalition only 
if many of the FDP’s manifesto demands are 
met. He has also avoided making statements 
regarding his coalition preferences before the 
elections. However, he admits that the manifes-
tos of the CDU/CSU have most in common with 
that of the FDP.
Taking into account the parties’ manifestos and 
their present approval ratings, three coalitions 
would be likely. The liberals would be present in 
two of them: CDU/CSU-FDP and CDU/CSU-FDP-
Green. However, the latter contains an inbuilt 
conflict between the liberals and the Greens. 
Despite the fact that these parties are members 
of ruling coalitions in two federal states, they 
have divergent views on many matters, for ex-
ample when it comes to climate protection. Ac-
cording to the FDP, the Greens’ attitude is too 
ideological and could be harmful to the econo-
my. The new government in North Rhine-West-
phalia (CDU-FDP) has been critical of the policy 
pursued by the former government (which in-
cluded the Greens), and has considerably limit-
ed the possibilities for constructing new wind 
farms in this federal state. Should these two 
parties become members of a ruling coalition 
at federal level, they would be on a collision 
course from the very beginning. Due to the un-
conventional style in which the Greens pursue 
politics, and to the value of confrontation with 
political opponents which the FDP has recently 
discovered, the new government would likely 
The party’s situation ahead of the elec-
tions remains unstable. The main problem 
is the lack of personnel.
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be unstable. At present, the liberals also view 
the Christian Democrats in a much more cau-
tious manner than they did in 2009, and during 
any potential coalition talks they will demand 
a guarantee that they will be able to deliver on 
their electoral promises. This will be somewhat 
easier because the main point in the FDP’s man-
ifesto no longer involves taxes, but education.
